Behavioral Economics and Venture Capital: The Impact of Investor Characteristics on Relative Financial Performance

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- Typically a small group of partners investing in a small group of startups

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 - (1) Individual investors have notably high impact
 - (2) Returns vary greatly across firms

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 - Higher levels of VC involvement and strategic advice (e.g. Bottazzi et al., 2008)
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 - Implies other investor characteristics will likewise have a meaningful impact on returns

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 - VCs broadly disagree about the cause of performance differences (e.g. Smart et al., 2000)

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- Challenge venture industry belief in benefit of operating experience
- Identify the relative impact of personality traits and economic preferences on financial performance

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- Firm-level controls combined from private market databases Pitchbook and Preqin
 - Industry investment preferences, geographic focus, median fund size

Descriptive Statistics | Background

		Prevelige Survey (2023)		Smart et al. Survey (1999)				
		# Obs	%	Count	# Obs	%	Mean	Difference in Means/Proportions
Position		104			115			
	Partner		93%	97		91%	105	-0.02
	Other		7%	7		9%	10	0.02
Degrees		104			115			
	MA/MS		24%	25		17%	20	-0.07
	MBA		55%	57		69%	79	0.14
	PhD/MD		7%	7		13%	15	0.06
Prior Work Experience		104			110			
	Entrepreneur/Operator		80%	83		75%	82	-0.05
	Banking/Finance		32%	33		33%	36	0.01
	Consulting		27%	28		25%	28	-0.01
	Corporate Management		25%	26		35%	38	0.10
	Technology		24%	25		16%	18	-0.08
	Marketing		14%	15		21%	23	0.06
	Sales		12%	12		12%	13	0.00
Stage of Investments		104			108			
	Mostly early stage		87%	90		63%	68	-0.24
	Equal or mostly late stage		13%	14		37%	40	0.24

Descriptive Statistics | Background Continued

		Prevelige Survey (2023)			Smart et al. Survey (1999)					
		# Obs	%	Mean	Sd	# Obs	%	Mean	Sd	Difference in Means/Proportions
Preferred Industries of Investmen	ıt	88				83				
	Business Products & Services		38%	NA	NA		48%	NA	NA	0.11
	Consumer Products & Services		41%	NA	NA		37%	NA	NA	-0.04
	Energy		15%	NA	NA		6%	NA	NA	-0.09
	Financial Services		26%	NA	NA		12%	NA	NA	-0.14
	Healthcare		52%	NA	NA		66%	NA	NA	0.14
	Information Technology		80%	NA	NA		89%	NA	NA	0.10
	Materials and Resources		17%	NA	NA		1%	NA	NA	-0.16
Quartile of Returns		104	NA	3.37	0.71	115	NA	3.78	0.48	0.41
Multiple on Invested Capital		104	NA	4.37	3.19	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
Years of Venture Experience		104	NA	13.34	6.68	110	NA	11.25	6.65	-2.09
Years of Prior Work Experience		104	NA	11.5	7.24	110	NA	10.73	7.16	-0.77
Median Fund Size (Millions USD)		86	NA	151.4	194.5	80	NA	203.97	181.76	52.57

Descriptive Statistics | Behavioral

				Full Sample	Reliable			
Group Instrument Construct				Mean	Sd	# Obs	Mean	Sd
Personality	BFI-2	Extraversion [3-15]	104	12.64	2.34	45	13.33	1.87
		Agreeableness [3-15]	104	12.63	1.73	45	13.04	1.43
		Conscientiousness [3-15]	104	12.44	2.28	45	12.98	2.12
		Neuroticism [3-15]	104	7.07	1.88	45	6.11	1.91
		Openness to Experience [3-15]	104	11.86	2.29	45	12.02	2.33
Economic Preference	Global Preferences Survey	Patience [1-5]	104	3.39	1.38	45	3.67	1.37
		Pain Tolerance [1-5]	104	3.84	1.15	45	4.20	1.01
		Risk Tolerance [1-10]	104	8.49	1.25	45	8.76	1.23
		Present Bias [1-10]	104	2.06	1.24	45	1.98	1.03
		Altruism [1-10]	104	8.82	1.34	45	9.00	1.17
		Positive Reciprocity [1-10]	104	9.20	1.17	45	9.31	1.16
		Negative Reciprocity [1-10]	104	4.34	2.06	45	4.22	2.15

Notes: The reliable sample consists of respondents who selected the highest measure of self-reported reliability on a 1-5 scale.

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 - Control for MOIC lag using years of venture experience

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 - X_i: Vector of controls

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 - Comprehensive; omitted characteristics are uncorrelated with individual characteristics and returns
- The background and behavioral characteristics of venture capitalists are not influenced by their returns
- The relationship between characteristics and returns are generally stable over time
- Measurement error may attenuate estimates, but coefficient directions are accurate

Results | Educational Attainment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
VARIABLES	Top Quartile							
MA/MS	-0.0214	-0.0309	-0.0395	-0.0876	0.0367	-0.0660		
	(0.0940)	(0.0936)	(0.0875)	(0.138)	(0.123)	(0.0960)		
MBA		-0.0605	0.0275	-0.0125	-0.0674	-0.0266		
		(0.0807)	(0.0706)	(0.141)	(0.114)	(0.0835)		
PhD/MD			0.118	0.319	0.0612	0.200*		
			(0.113)	(0.267)	(0.125)	(0.119)		
Constant	0.513***	0.545***	0.613***	0.205	0.814***	0.520***		
	(0.191)	(0.199)	(0.0618)	(0.332)	(0.277)	(0.198)		
Controls	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		
Prevelige Only				\checkmark				
Smart Only					\checkmark			
Observations	162	162	215	86	76	162		
R-squared	0.224	0.227	0.005	0.181	0.129	0.236		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Controls include years of venture experience, years of VC experience*smart, median fund size, and dummies for firm characteristics: whether investments are mostly early stage, global, and preferences for each of the 7 industries.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
VARIABLES	Top Quartile									
Entrepreneur/Operator	-0.0707	-0.0563	-0.0620	-0.0716	-0.0694	-0.0853	-0.0657	-0.0486	-0.0545	-0.0859
Banking/Finance	(0.0852)	(0.0888) 0.0380	(0.0897) 0.0310	(0.0947) 0.0363	(0.0957) 0.0358	(0.0968) 0.0477	(0.0850) 0.0870	(0.189) 0.0283	(0.133) 0.129	(0.0968 0.0480
		(0.0827)	(0.0852)	(0.0863)	(0.0867)	(0.0883)	(0.0746)	(0.134)	(0.123)	(0.0888
Consulting			-0.0478 (0.0826)	-0.0489 (0.0831)	-0.0486 (0.0836)	-0.0469 (0.0843)	-0.00580 (0.0766)	-0.125 (0.142)	-0.0346 (0.113)	-0.0464 (0.0846
Corporate Management			(0.0820)	0.0400 (0.0878)	0.0411 (0.0898)	0.0333 (0.0906)	0.0263 (0.0784)	-0.000873 (0.140)	-0.00541 (0.143)	0.0302
Sales				(0.0010)	-0.0153 (0.115)	-0.0346 (0.117)	-0.0916 (0.110)	0.106 (0.177)	-0.161 (0.192)	-0.0437 (0.127)
Technology					(01110)	0.0900 (0.0898)	0.0409 (0.0887)	-0.0684 (0.152)	0.312*** (0.109)	0.0878
Marketing						()	0.142 (0.0934)	0.0181 (0.165)	-0.0178 (0.161)	0.0204
Constant	0.574*** (0.210)	0.554** (0.222)	0.593*** (0.219)	0.581*** (0.222)	0.577** (0.223)	0.568** (0.225)	0.624*** (0.0833)	0.286 (0.396)	0.785** (0.297)	0.571*
Controls Prevelige Only	¥	1	✓	× ´	1	1		4	1	1
Smart Only									~	
Observations	162	161	161	161	161	161	214	86	75	161
R-squared	0.226	0.225	0.227	0.228	0.228	0.233	0.020	0.178	0.217	0.233

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Controls include years of venture experience, years of VC experience*smart, median fund size, and dumnies for firm characteristics: whether investments are mostly early stage, global, and preferences for each of the 7 industries.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
VARIABLES	Top Quartile								
Extraversion	-0.207*					-0.131	-0.317***		
Extraversion	(0.106)					(0.0897)	(0.100)		
Agreeableness		-0.148				-0.0737	-0.0970		
		(0.122)				(0.0790)	(0.0885)		
Conscientiousness			-0.284***			-0.0659	-0.334***		
			(0.0863)			(0.0749)	(0.0913)		
Neuroticism				-0.0257		-0.0138	0.0412		
				(0.120)		(0.0855)	(0.0812)		
Open-Mindedness					0.0889	0.0798	0.142*		
					(0.104)	(0.0765)	(0.0778)		
Constant	-0.240	0.0513	-0.455	-0.183	-0.317	0.463***	-0.742		
	(0.550)	(0.592)	(0.495)	(0.554)	(0.540)	(0.0812)	(0.601)		
Controls	1	1	1	1	1		1		
Observations	38	38	38	38	38	45	38		
R-squared	0.331	0.283	0.369	0.242	0.260	0.097	0.589		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Controls include years of venture experience, median fund size, and dummies for firm characteristics: whether investments are mostly early stage, global, and preferences for each of the 7 industries. Responses are restricted to the highest value of self-reported reliability.

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) Top Quartile	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIADELS					TopQuartite				
Patience	-0.0888							-0.0370	-0.0651
	(0.103)							(0.0844)	(0.0854)
Pain Tolerance		0.169**						0.119	0.227**
		(0.0810)						(0.0812)	(0.0946)
Risk Tolerance			0.0820					0.0662	0.0119
			(0.114)					(0.108)	(0.169)
Present Bias				-0.178				-0.0672	-0.201
				(0.134)				(0.101)	(0.156)
Altruism					-0.111			-0.142	-0.150
					(0.102)			(0.0948)	(0.138)
Positive Reciprocity						-0.0600		-0.0538	-0.150
						(0.0993)		(0.104)	(0.141)
Negative Reciprocity							0.0932	0.0363	0.0702
							(0.0771)	(0.0830)	(0.0867)
Constant	-0.198	-0.185	-0.00339	-0.113	-0.244	-0.210	-0.227	0.378***	-0.543
	(0.529)	(0.552)	(0.554)	(0.564)	(0.529)	(0.532)	(0.560)	(0.0776)	(0.571)
Controls	~	1	~	~	~	~	1		~
Observations	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	45	38
R-squared	0.265	0.303	0.254	0.299	0.271	0.249	0.269	0.149	0.504

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Notes: Controls include years of venture experience, median fund size, and dummies for firm characteristics: whether investments are mostly early stage, global, and preferences for each of the 7 industries. Responses are restricted to the highest value of self-reported reliability.

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- Positive effects from:
 - PhD/MD, knowledge in early & growing markets

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 - high pain tolerance, risk tolerance, open-mindedness, future bias

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 - Intuition: bias from prior experience may reduce openness to alternative, viable leadership strategies

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• Panel data with greater number and variability of respondents

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- Factor analysis to identify archetypes of investors and their relative performance

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THANK YOU!